Grundgesetze, as mentioned, was to be Frege’s magnum opus. It was to provide rigorous, gapless proofs that arithmetic was just logic further. Gottlob Frege’s Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, or Basic Laws of Arithmetic, was intended to be his magnum opus, the book in which he would. Gottlob Frege’s Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, or Basic Laws of Arithmetic, was intended to be his magnum opus, the book in which he would finally establish his .

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This completes the proof of Theorem 3.

Hume’s Principle states that two concepts have the same cardinal number if and only if there exists a bijection between them. This can be represented formally as follows:.

MacFarlane addresses grundgdsetze question, and points out that their conceptions differ in various ways: Essays in History and PhilosophyJ. Philosophy portal Logic portal. Functions that take first-level functions as argument are called second-level functions. Contributions to Logic Trained as a mathematician, Frege’s interests in logic grew out of his interests in the foundations of arithmetic.

The concept being human is understood as a function that has the True as value for any argument that is human, and the False as value for anything else. The Logic Behind Frege’s Logicism 2. Few philosophers today believe that mathematics can be reduced to logic in the way Frege had in mind. It is likely that Frege was offered a position as full Professor, but turned it down to avoid taking on additional administrative duties.


Let us call the new, defined symbol introduced in a definition the definiendumand the term that is used to define the new term the definiens.

Gottlob Frege – Wikipedia

Johann Friedrich Hartknoch, 1st edition A; 2nd edition B Frege’s logicism was limited to arithmetic; unlike other important historical logicists, such as Russell, Frege did not think that geometry was a branch of logic.

He suggests, against the usual understanding, that the definition of ‘cardinal number’ in Grundgesetze might not actually differ from his earlier definition in Grundlagen. But if R implies L as a matter of meaning, and L implies D as a matter of meaning, then R implies D as a rfege of meaning. Chapter 9 looks at Frege’s proof that every subset grundgseetze a countable set is countable and shows that Frege proves, as a lemma, a generalized version of the least number principle.

Gottlob Frege (1848—1925)

Northwestern University Press, Filling the argument-place with the name of an object does not yield a well-formed expression. The Interpretation of Frege’s Philosophy. Heck’s insightful analysis and careful arguments leave little for the reviewer to complain about.

Thus, one and the same physical entity might be conceptualized as consisting of 1 army, 5 divisions, 20 regiments, companies, etc. The language of the second-order predicate calculus starts with the following lists of simple terms:. There is only one such number zero.

Frege’s Theorem and Foundations for Arithmetic (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

But, of course, Frege’s view and Kant’s view contradict each other only if they have the same conception of logic. Part II examines the mathematical basis of Frege’s logicism, explaining and exploring Frege’s formal arguments.

His aim was to make this the first of a three volume work; in the second and third, he would move on to the definition of real numbers, and the demonstration of their properties.


Source Notre Dame J. I’d like to thank to Emily Bender, who pointed out that I hadn’t observed the distinction between relative and subordinate clauses in discussing Frege’s analysis of belief reports. Understanding number-claims as involving second-level concepts does give us some insight into the nature of numbers, but it cannot be left at this.

The proofs of these facts, in each case, require the identification of a relation that is a witness to the relevant equinumerosity claim. Frege next defines the relation x is an ancestor of y in the R-series.

To see the problem posed by the analysis of propositional attitude reports, consider what appears to be a simple principle of reasoning, namely, the Principle of Identity Substitution this is not to be confused with the Rule of Substitution discussed earlier. That’s because the subject John and the grudngesetze object Mary are both considered on a logical par, as arguments of the function loves.

Frege’s Theorem and Foundations for Arithmetic

Secondary Literature Anderson, D. MacFarlane goes on to point out that Frege’s logic also contains higher-order quantifiers i. Oxford University Press, argues the same from a different angle. Exactly, however, are they to be understood?